Showing posts with label Tragedies in Science. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tragedies in Science. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 7, 2012

Tragedies in Science: The Collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge

Since it's collapse in 1940, the Tacoma Narrows
Bridge has been rebuilt, this time as a
twin suspension bridge. Image courtesy: WSDOT (Flickr CC)
When you think of iconic bridges of the world, the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, which spans a narrow strait in the Puget Sound south of Seattle, may not come to mind immediately.  But that bridge (today it's actually a set of twin bridges--one for each direction of traffic) has an incredible history that serves as a serious cautionary tale for engineers.

The original Tacoma Narrows bridge, completed in 1940, was a long time in the making but short-lived once it was finally built. The idea of building a bridge across the sound to connect the city of Tacoma to the Kitsap Peninsula dates back to at least 1889.  During the 1920s and 30s a number of citizen campaigns and leaders supported various designs and approaches to building a bridge. 

One of the major sticking points for all of these efforts was the cost. In 1938, the state of Washington applied for federal funding to build the bridge. The state bridge engineer, Clark Eldridge, drew up a fairly standard suspension bridge design with an estimated price tag of $11 million, but officials were skeptical that a project of that magnitude could pay for itself in bridge tolls.  In the end, they granted the state $6.4 million and required them to hire Leon Moisseiff, a bridge engineer from New York who said the bridge could be built for much less than $11 million.

Moisseff's plan was indeed much less expensive because his design used far less steel and called for the Tacoma Narrows Bridge to be very light and narrow compared to other suspension bridges of the time. When they saw the plan, engineers at the Washington State Highway Department protested, calling the bridge design "fundamentally unsound."  But that did not stop the project.  Construction began on November 23, 1938.

During construction, workers noticed that the bridge bounced.  Soon after opening in July 1940, the bridge became known by engineers and motorists alike for "the bounce" or "the ripple."  It was rated to withstand winds up to 120 miles per hour, but even in a light breeze the bridge moved.  Motorists reported waves, sometimes up to 5 feet tall, undulating from one end of the bridge to the other.  Sometimes the bouncing was short-lived, but on occasion it was reported to last for up to six hours. The bridge earned the nickname Galloping Gertie.  Some locals steered clear of Gertie out of fear or to avoid sea sickness; others sought it out as a thrill ride.

In the spring of 1940, the Toll Bridge Authority contacted Moisseiff who reported that two of his other recent bridges were having similar movement issues, but at a smaller scale. The Authority then hired engineering professor F. Bert Farquharson from the University of Washington to find a solution to the problem.  Farquharson and his students built scale models of the bridge and conducted wind tunnel experiments.  In October, engineers added temporary tie-down cables to anchor the bridge to the seafloor and diagonal cables between the bridge's deck and the main cables to brace it.  This helped limit the bridge's movement, but not enough.

In early November, as workers repaired one of the tie-down cables that had broken loose from Gertie's galloping, Farquharson completed his wind tunnel studies.  He noted a torsional (twisting) motion in the bridge model under high wind conditions.  "We watched it," Farquharson later told reporters, "and we said that if that sort of motion ever occurred on the real bridge, it would be the end of the bridge."

Guided by Farquharson's findings, the Toll Bridge Authority began drawing up a contract to have wind deflectors installed on the bridge. The morning of November 7, the state bridge engineer, Clark Eldridge was sketching plans for the deflectors, pricing materials, and preparing a rapid response that would have had the entire bridge covered in wind deflectors within 45 days. But they were too late.

By 7:30 am, 42-mile-per-hour winds were rushing up the Narrows from the Southwest and hitting Gertie broadside.  She began to gallop. Farquharson, Eldridge, and a crowd of spectators began to gather, photographing and even taking video of the bridge.  At 10:03 am, the bridge suddenly began the lateral twisting motion that Farquharson had feared.  Pieces of concrete from the roadway began to break free, and at 11:02 am, a 600-foot span collapsed into the sound.  Galloping Gertie had failed.


Footage from the Nov 7, 1940 collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge. Courtesy: Internet Archives

Fortunately, no humans and only one dog died during the collapse, but the outcome could have easily been much worse.  In a situation like this who is to blame?  Did the collapse of the bridge result from an ethical breach or an honest miscalculation?  Does the designer of the bridge bear responsibility?  What about the federal officials who put construction costs above other considerations--including perhaps safety--when selecting a design and funding the project?

Answers to ethical questions like these are not always straightforward.  Fortunately, though, there are standards of conduct and general principles that members of the scientific community abide by.  You're probably familiar with the Hippocratic Oath that doctors take, declaring that (among other things) they vow to do no harm to their patients.  In the U.S., the National Society of Professional Engineers' code of ethics declares that engineers shall "hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public." General standards relating to scientific methods and to topics of study (especially human and animal subjects) also guide researchers.

So what if Clark Eldridge's original (more expensive) design had been built instead of Leon Moisseiff's lighter, cheaper version?  Structural engineers who reviewed the original plans for the State of Washington concluded that the bridge would likely still be standing.


LEARN MORE
For more about ethical standards and dilemmas in science and engineering, read our Scientific Ethics module.

For more about how models of all types are used in research, visit our module Research Methods: Modeling.

For more about the history and design of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge (and other suspension bridges), check out the Washington State Department of Transportation's More Than a Bridge site.

Friday, September 21, 2012

Tragedies in Science: The Crash of the Mars Climate Orbiter

In science, as in the rest of life, things don't always go as planned. From time to time, accidents, mistakes, and tragedies happen. In the worst cases, these experiences result in serious losses or even catastrophes that can affect many people. In less severe cases they are the painful (and sometimes expensive) blunders that we can eventually look back and laugh about.

But in almost every case--whether caused by bad luck, bad planning, lack of understanding, simple human error, or systemic problems in a research team or a society--there is something to be learned from these experiences. Always double check your unit conversions. Train your field crew for the harshest possible conditions and the worst case scenario. Recognize your colleagues and their contributions before it's too late.

The tragedies of science often don't appear in text books or journal articles, but they are just as much a part of science as any discovery or triumph. And, as you'll see in the first installment of our new Tragedies in Science blog series, even "rocket scientists" make mistakes. By taking a closer look at some of the accidents and tragedies of the past, we can find both practical lessons for the future and inspiration for how to persevere and learn from tragedy.


The Crash of the Mars Climate Orbiter 

An artist's concept showing NASA's Mars Climate Orbiter, which was
lost due to a unit conversion error 13 years ago. Image courtesy: NASA/JPL
September 23, 1999 should have been a day of excitement and celebration for researchers and science enthusiasts everywhere. That was the date--13 years ago this Sunday--that NASA's Mars Climate Orbiter was supposed to claim its spot in orbit around the Red Planet, roughly 180 km above the Martian surface. From that vantage point, the Orbiter would monitor conditions and send information back to Earth as part of the Mars Surveyor Program, which launched a series of missions in the 1990's and 2000's to study one of our closest neighbors in the solar system.

But the $125 million Orbiter was doomed.

As the spacecraft neared its destination, the engineers at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory who were guiding the Orbiter thought everything was on target. Then, when the craft made it's final maneuvers to enter orbit, they lost communications. Something was wrong.

By examining data from the previous eight hours of the Orbiter's journey, NASA realized that the craft's approach had been much lower than intended--about 60 km above the planet's surface instead of 150 to 180 km. The altered course meant a rough ride through the Martian atmosphere that the Orbiter was not designed to withstand. The following day, the engineers concluded that the spacecraft had not survived the miscalculation, and the search for the Orbiter was abandoned.

Within a week of the accident, two committees (one internal and one composed of outside experts) had been formed to investigate what had gone wrong. They concluded that a simple mathematical and communications error was at the heart of the problem: one part of the mission team had used English units while the another part of the team had used metric units when making calculations related to the jet thrusters used to correct the Orbiter's trajectory during it's journey. A flubbed unit conversion had cost them a $125 million spacecraft, years of work, and untold scientific knowledge.

Luckily, unit conversion errors are an easy problem to fix, and you can bet NASA won't be repeating that mistake. In a statement released shortly after the crash, Dr. Edward Weiler, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Science, said: "The problem here was not the error, it was the failure of NASA's systems engineering, and the checks and balances in our processes to detect the error. That's why we lost the spacecraft."
 

LEARN MORE 
Check out our Unit Conversion module for more about the Orbiter's demise and a primer on how to avoid a mistake like NASA's.

See Time's picks for the "Top 10 NASA Flubs."
 
And please let us know what you think of the first installment and the series as a whole! We are also always on the lookout for other tragic stories in science, so please share your ideas.